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N.J.R.E. 608 and Specific Instances of Conduct: The Time Has Come for New Jersey to Join the 
Majority  
Jenn Montan* 
 
I. Introduction 
Every trial, whether criminal or civil, requires the factfinder, whether judge or jury, to 
carefully weigh the competing evidence and determine the disputed issues between the parties.  As 
such, the right of the parties to impeach the credibility of the witnesses is fundamental to the truth-
seeking process in all litigation.  The right to impeach is considered such an important right that 
Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 607 expressly authorizes witness impeachment and provides that 
“[a]ny party, including the party that called the witness, may attack the witness’s credibility.”1    
There are various, well-recognized grounds for impeaching the credibility of a witness.  
For example, a party may show that a witness is biased in favor of or against a particular party, 
that the witness lacks competency because of a mental or sensory incapacity or a lack of personal 
knowledge, or that the witness has made a prior statement which is inconsistent with the witness’s 
testimony.2  Another recognized method for impeaching the credibility of a witness is to 
demonstrate that the witness possesses a character trait for untruthfulness.3  An attack on a 
witness’s character for truthfulness is designed to demonstrate that the witness is by disposition 
untruthful and therefore not credible as a witness in any case.4  It is this impeachment attack that 
raises difficult questions as to the proper method for proving a witness’s character for truthfulness 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Montclair State University. 
1 FED. R. EVID. 607 (emphasis added).  New Jersey Rule of Evidence (N.J.R.E.) 607 similarly authorizes and extends 
the right to impeach to the party calling the witness.  See N.J.R.E. 607 (“Except as otherwise provided by Rules 405 
and 608, for the purpose of impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party including the party calling 
the witness may examine the witness and introduce extrinsic evidence relevant to the issue of credibility . . . .”) 
(emphasis added).  
2 ROGER PARK & TOM LININGER, THE NEW WIGMORE. A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: IMPEACHMENT AND 
REHABILITATION § 2.1 (2017).  
3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6111 (2d ed. 2017).  
4 Id.   
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and the extent to which untruthful character evidence may be shown through cross-examination or 
through the introduction of extrinsic evidence.  
Specifically, the question arises whether, and in what manner, a witness may be impeached 
with specific instances of non-conviction misconduct that are probative of the witness’s character 
for truthfulness.  The New Jersey Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in State v. Scott, a 
case which squarely presented the division between FRE 608 and N.J.R.E. 608 and triggered two 
divergent concurring opinions as to the proper course for New Jersey law going forward.5  
With respect to impeachment of a witness’s character for truthfulness, both FRE 608(a) 
and N.J.R.E. 608(a) expressly provide that a party may attack or support a witness’s character for 
truthfulness through the introduction of character witnesses who may testify in the form of 
reputation or opinion as to the witness’s character for truthfulness.6  In addition, FRE 608(b) and 
N.J.R.E. 608(a) both prohibit the introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove specific instances of 
conduct in order to attack or support a witness’s character for truthfulness.7 
FRE 608(b) and N.J.R.E. 608(a) diverge, however, on whether inquiry on cross-
examination may be permitted as to specific instances of conduct that are probative of the witness’s 
character for truthfulness.  FRE 608(b) expressly provides that the court may allow such inquiry 
on cross-examination,8 whereas N.J.R.E. 608(a) prohibits such inquiry.9  N.J.R.E. 608(a) provides 
that “a trait of character cannot be proved by specific instances of conduct”10 and the New Jersey 
                                                 
5 State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 488 (2017).  
6 FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (“A witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by testimony about the witness’s 
reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about 
that character . . . .”); N.J.R.E. 608(a) (“The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the 
form of opinion or reputation, provided, however, that the evidence relates only to the witness’ character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness . . .”). 
7 See FED. R. EVID. 608(b); N.J.R.E. 608(a).  
8 FED. R. EVID. 608(b). 
9 N.J.R.E. 608(a) 
10 Id. 
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courts interpret this provision to prohibit not only the introduction of extrinsic evidence of specific 
instances of conduct, but also inquiry as to such conduct on cross-examination.11  FRE 608(b) 
provides in pertinent part:   
Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not 
admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or 
support the witness’s character for truthfulness.  But the court may, on cross-
examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character 
for truthfulness or untruthfulness of: (1) the witness; or (2) another witness whose 
character the witness being cross-examined has testified about.12 
 
N.J.R.E. 608(a) provides:  
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form 
of opinion or reputation, provided, however, that the evidence relates only to the 
witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and provided further that 
evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness 
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
Except as otherwise provided by Rule 609 and by paragraph (b) of this rule, a trait 
of character cannot be proved by specific instances of conduct.13  
  New Jersey’s formulation falls in the minority approach with respect to the use of specific 
instances of conduct to impeach a witness’s character for truthfulness.14  Only three other states 
have complete ban on the use of specific instances of conduct.15  This departure from FRE 608(b) 
became the focal point of debate between Chief Justice Rabner and Justice Albin in State v. Scott.  
In State v. Scott, the defendant, Thomas Scott, was charged with possession of heroin.16  At 
trial, he argued that he did not knowingly possess the heroin because someone else placed it in his 
jeans pocket before he put them on.17  Defendant sought to call his mother, Darlene Barbella, to 
                                                 
11 State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 488 (2017) (Rabner, C.J., concurring) (“N.J.R.E. 608, however, bars not only the use 
of extrinsic evidence but also cross-examination into specific instances of misconduct.”).  
12 FED. R. EVID. 608(b). 
13 N.J.R.E. 608(a) (emphasis added). 
14 Scott, 229 N.J. at 491 (Rabner, C.J., concurring).    
15 See MASS. GUIDE EVID. 608(b); OR. R. REV. Rule 608; TEX. R. EVID. 608(b). 
16 Scott, 229 N.J. at 473. 
17 Id. 
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testify in support of this contention.18  Barbella was going to testify that she found the heroin in 
defendant’s apartment lying on a table next to defendant’s cousin and known drug user, Jordan 
Scott, and placed the heroin in the pocket of a pair of jeans she believed belonged to Jordan.19  To 
impeach her, the State sought to introduce evidence of two prior occasions on which Barbella 
allegedly lied to police to exonerate her son, the defendant.20  The trial court ruled the State’s 
evidence admissible.21  As a result, the defendant chose not to call Barbella and instead called 
Lauren Halbersberg, defendant’s friend, to testify to the same events.22   
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the evidence would have been 
admissible at trial.23  In holding that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that the proposed 
impeachment testimony was admissible, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the State’s 
argument that Rule 608 provided grounds for admissibility.24  The court noted that “Rule 608 
explicitly excludes specific instances of conduct as a means of proving character for 
untruthfulness, permitting only opinion or reputation evidence.”25 
This finding by the court regarding the application of N.J.R.E. 608 prompted concurring 
opinions from Chief Justice Rabner and Justice Albin debating whether New Jersey’s bar on the 
use of specific instances of conduct to impeach a witness’s character for truthfulness is still a 
proper approach.26  Chief Justice Rabner argued that the outcome of the case highlights the 
problems posed by the current rule.27  As a result, the Chief Justice proposed that it is time to 
                                                 
18 Id. at 474. 
19 Id.  
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Scott, 229 N.J. at 474. 
23 Id. at 477.  
24 Id. at 483. 
25 Id.    
26 Id. at 486 (Rabner, C.J., concurring); Id. 494–95 (Albin, J., concurring). 
27 Id. at 492 (Rabner, C.J., concurring).    
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consider whether N.J.R.E. 608 should be revised to fall in line with the majority of states and its 
federal counter part, FRE 608.28  Chief Justice Rabner highlighted the disadvantages of New 
Jersey’s rule and called upon the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of Evidence 
to consider the question for “a simple reason: the topic relates directly to the jury’s search for the 
truth, which a system of justice should foster.”29  
In response, Justice Albin argued that no justification for altering the current version 
exists.30  Justice Albin explained that the current Rule is in line with the historic development of 
New Jersey’s common law, which has always barred such evidence because its probative value is 
outweighed by the potential prejudice of diverting jurors from the central issues in a case.31  Justice 
Albin posited that while New Jersey’s rules may not be perfect, they “accommodate two important 
goals: the search for truth and the need for fairness in [the] criminal and civil justice system.”32 
State v. Scott highlighted some of the problems and dangers N.J.R.E. 608 has created and 
has presented the opportunity to assess New Jersey’s approach and determine whether change is 
needed.  This Comment will examine the arguments set forth in the concurring opinions in State 
v. Scott and consider whether New Jersey should amend N.J.R.E. 608(a) and adopt the majority 
approach and allow, on cross-examination, the use of specific instances of conduct that are 
probative of the witness’s character for untruthfulness.  Part II will review New Jersey’s approach 
by examining the history and development of N.J.R.E. 608 from common law to its current 
formulation and review how the rule is applied with regard to specific instances of conduct.  Part 
III will examine the majority approach with a focus on the formulation and application of the 
                                                 
28 Scott, 229 N.J. at 494. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 496 (Albin, J., concurring).   
31 Id. at 495.   
32 Id. at 496.   
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federal analogue to N.J.R.E. 608, FRE 608.  Part IV will assess the potential dangers of allowing 
specific instances of conduct and examine the arguments and counter arguments regarding how 
the majority approach addresses these issues.  Part V will examine New Jersey’s options to address 
this issue and make changes to the current rule.  Overall, this Comment will argue that New 
Jersey’s current formulation of Rule 608 does not adequately address the use of specific instances 
of conduct.  While apprehension for allowing the use of specific instances of conduct is valid, a 
complete bar raises equally valid concerns; adoption of a rule that takes a restrictive approach will 
provide an adequate compromise that properly addresses the issues raised on both sides.  
II. Development of N.J.R.E. 608 
New Jersey is one of four states that have a complete bar on the use of specific instances 
of conduct to prove a character trait.33  This approach embodies the New Jersey common-law rule. 
Early cases made clear that an attempt to impeach the character of a witness is limited to the 
witness’s reputation in the community for truth and veracity.34  For example, in an early case from 
1883 the rule was set out by the court in Paul v. Paul.35  The court held that unless character is the 
central issue, such as rape, or breach of promise, “proof that a witness was a common prostitute, 
                                                 
33 See supra text accompanying notes 12–13.  
34 See King v. Ruckman, 20 N.J. Eq. 316, 357 (Ch. 1869) (“But the greatest portion of the testimony is such as 
cannot be regarded.  It is evidently founded upon the fact that Ruckman has been guilty of very improper conduct 
with regard to the cattle of his neighbors, [and] is a troublesome, litigious man . . . .  Such witnesses are necessarily 
produced when they alone know or witnessed facts required to be proved; but when selected to give character to a 
witness, are not of much value.  The only testimony allowed in such case is as to the general reputation of the 
witness impeached, in the neighborhood, for truth and veracity . . . .”), rev’d, 21 N.J. Eq. 599 (1870); see also 
Atwood v. Impson, 20 N.J. Eq. 150, 157 (Ch. 1869) (“[P]articular transactions . . . [are] not evidence which the law 
permits, or should permit, to affect the credibility of a witness. . . .  The object of the law is to show the character of 
the witness as to telling the truth; general reputation in the community where he is known, is the test and the only 
test which the law allows as to character.”); State v. Hendrick, 70 N.J.L. 41, 45 (Sup. Ct. 1903) (“A witness may be 
discredited by evidence attacking his character for truth and veracity but not by the proof of particular independent 
facts, though bearing upon the question of veracity.”).   
35 37 N.J. Eq. 23 (Ch. 1883). 
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offered to impeach her testimony, is incompetent.”36  The court cited La Beau v. People, for the 
general rule that 
inquiries as to particular acts of immorality [are] inadmissible . . . it would be 
impossible for the witness to be prepared for a defense of particular acts, and it 
would lead to an indefinite number of issues.  Therefore, on an issue upon the 
character of a witness, it cannot be allowed to inquire into particular facts.37   
 
Early on, New Jersey recognized the potential dangers of allowing inquiries into specific instances 
of conduct to prove a character trait and as a result followed this general rule that barred use of 
such evidence.  
In State v. De Paola, decided in 1950, the Supreme Court of New Jersey continued with 
the application of this common-law rule.38  The defendant was convicted of murder.39  At trial, the 
defendant took the stand and on cross-examination was asked about prior liquor-license 
applications in which the defendant allegedly provided a false answer to a question on the 
application while under oath.40  The prosecution aimed to use the specific instances of conduct to 
show that if the defendant had lied on multiple applications, then he was lying now and his 
testimony could not be trusted.41  The defendant was compelled to answer the question and 
admitted that each year from 1941 to 1948, he had lied on the liquor-license applications.42  On 
appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing this line of questioning on cross-
examination.43  The State argued that the matter was within the discretion of the trial court and the 
testimony objected to was permissible to show lack of veracity on the part of the defendant.44  The 
                                                 
36 Id. at 26.  
37 33 How. Pr. 66, 72 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1865). 
38 5 N.J. 1 (1950). 
39 Id. at 7.  
40 Id. at 9. 
41 Id. at 10 
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 De Paola, 5 N.J. at 10. 
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court found little merit to the State’s theory, noting that there was no authority cited in support of 
its contention.45   
The court examined New Jersey case law regarding the approach to this issue and found 
that New Jersey had adopted a “rule which excludes the proof of independent facts to discredit a 
witness.”46  The court noted that the acts referred to were not connected to the charge upon which 
the defendant was being tried and were unrelated to the central issues of the case.47  Moreover, the 
defendant had not been convicted for perjury or false swearing by reason of his misconduct in this 
respect.48  In light of these findings, the court held that the admission of the testimony was 
reversible error.49  
De Paola and the early New Jersey cases illustrate the rule regarding inquiry into specific 
instances of conduct that New Jersey had developed.  Prior bad acts that did not result in a 
conviction that were probative of a witness’s character for untruthfulness could not be inquired 
into on cross-examination.  Some of the underlying rationales were that such testimony was 
collateral to the main issues of the case and it would be unreasonable to expect that a defendant-
witness could be prepared to defend against possible questioning into any area of his life.50   
New Jersey formally codified the prohibition on specific instances of conduct in 1967 
under N.J. EVID. R. 22(d), which provided, “as affecting the credibility of a witness . . . evidence 
of specific instances of his conduct, relevant only as tending to prove a trait of his character, shall 
                                                 
45 Id. at 11.  
46 Id. at 12 (quoting State v. Hendrick, 70 N.J.L. 41, 45 (Sup. Ct. 1903)).   
47 Id. at 13. 
48 Id. at 10. 
49 Id. at 13. 
50 See also Ippolito v. Turp, 126 N.J.L. 403, 407 (1940) (“Every man is supposed to be capable of supporting his 
general reputation whenever it is attacked but not to meet specific transactions not an issue in the cause.”).  
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be inadmissible.”51  When N.J. EVID. R. 22 was prepared it was “representative of current New 
Jersey [common] law.”52   
In the early 1980s, the New Jersey Supreme Court appointed a Committee on the Rules of 
Evidence to survey the feasibility of amending the New Jersey evidence rules.53  The Committee 
was to consider whether or to what extent New Jersey should adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
which were enacted in 1975 and by that time were followed by many states.54  In 1991, the 
Committee recommended a sweeping change in the New Jersey evidence scheme and the new 
rules went into effect in 1993.55  The revised rules constituted an amalgamation of the federal and 
then-current New Jersey evidence rules, following federal numeration and arrangement.56   
New N.J.R.E. 608 incorporated the limiting principles of N.J. EVID. R. 22(d) with respect 
to admission of evidence of a trait of character for truthfulness or untruthfulness when offered 
under N.J. EVID. R. 20 to affect the credibility of a witness.57  The Committee noted that N.J.R.E. 
608 follows the formulation of FRE 608; however, the Committee rejected the provision in 
paragraph (b) of the federal rule that allowed for the use of specific instances of conduct on cross-
examination.58  The Committee believed that this rejection “retains present New Jersey practice” 
noting that “N.J. EVID. R. 22(d), followed by this rule, prohibited ‘specific instances of conduct’ 
proof in any form if introduced to prove a trait of character.”59  Moreover, the Committee believed 
                                                 
51 N.J. EVID. R. 22 (effective 1967).  
52 Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence, March 1963 (1963) (citing State v. De Paola, 5 
N.J. 1 (1950)).  
53 Alma G. Lopez, New Jersey’s Other-Crimes Rules and the Evidence Committee’s Abrogation of Almost Two 
Hundred Years of Judicial Precedent, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 394, 423 (1993). 
54 Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence, 129 N.J.L.J. 1 (Oct. 10, 1991). 
55 Lopez, supra note 53, at 425–26 (citing Stephen W. Townsend, Esq., Notices to the Bar: Supreme Court of New 
Jersey Revisions to the Rules of Evidence, 134 N.J.L.J. 798, 798 (July 5, 1993)). 
56 Lopez, supra note 49, at 423. 
57 Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence, 129 N.J.L.J. 1, 25 (Oct. 10, 1991). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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that N.J.R.E. 607 already “affords sufficient scope for the effective impeachment of credibility.”60  
Thus, New Jersey maintained its approach to specific instances of conduct in rejecting the federal 
formulation.  
In 2004, a case came before the New Jersey Supreme Court that forced the court to consider 
whether the general prohibition on specific conduct evidence could be subject to an exception in a 
particular context.61  In State v. Guenther, the court had to decide whether the credibility of a 
witness who has accused a defendant of sexual abuse may be impeached by evidence that the 
witness had made a prior false criminal accusation.62  The defendant, Kenneth Guenther, was 
accused by his stepdaughter, D.F., of sexually abusing her over the course of five years.63  During 
trial, defendant received documents revealing that D.F. admitted to falsely accusing her neighbor 
of sexually abusing her.64  The defense requested permission to cross-examine D.F. regarding this 
prior false accusation and in the event that she denied making the false accusation, the defendant 
stated his intent to impeach D.F. with extrinsic evidence.65  The trial court denied this request and 
ruled that “the purported false accusation was ‘irrelevant’ and ‘extremely collateral’ and, therefore, 
inappropriate for consideration by the jury.”66  The defendant was convicted of sexual assault.67   
On appeal from the trial court, the Appellate Division remanded for the determination of 
whether D.F. made the false accusation and if so whether it was false.68  The court directed that if 
it is found that the accusation was made but determined that the evidence was inadmissible, the 
                                                 
60 Id. 
61 State v. Guenther, 181 N.J. 129, 132 (2004).  
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 134.  
64 Id. at 132. 
65 Id. at 133.  
66 Id. at 134.  
67 Guenther, 181 N.J. at 138.  
68 Id. 
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verdict would stand.69  If the court found, however, that D.F. made the false accusation and that it 
was admissible, a new trial would be necessary.70  The State petitioned for certification arguing 
that the decision was contrary to N.J.R.E. 608 and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted 
certification to address the issue.71 
The court had to determine whether the common-law principle embodied in N.J.R.E. 608 
had continuing vitality when applied to evidence of a victim-witness’s prior false accusation.72  
The court traced the development of the rule noting that it was “not a lack of relevance that gave 
rise to the rule” prohibiting the use of specific instances of conduct to attack the witness’s character 
for truthfulness, but “the ‘auxiliary policies’ regarding unfairness to the witness, confusion of 
issues, and undue consumption of time.”73  Thus, according to the court, these auxiliary policies 
illustrate that the bar on the use of specific instances of conduct to prove a character trait was 
adopted “for pragmatic reasons associated with the efficient and orderly presentation of a trial.”74  
These reasons remain the present justification for the rule today.75  The court explained, however, 
that when these “auxiliary policies” do not apply, the rationale for the exclusion of such evidence 
no longer exists.76  
With these principles in mind, the court then addressed whether limited circumstances 
warrant an exception to N.J.R.E. 608.77  The court noted that various jurisdictions across the 
country have addressed this issue and in sexual crime cases have permitted cross-examination of 
                                                 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 138–39. 
72 Id. at 141. 
73 Guenther, 181 N.J. at 142 (citing 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 979, at 827 (Chadbourn rev.1970)). 
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 141.  
76 Id. at 142.  
77 Id. at 147.  
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a witness-accuser who has falsely alleged a sexual crime on a previous occasion.78  In light of this, 
the court concluded that in a criminal case involving impeachment of a victim-witness whose 
credibility was the central issue in the case, a defendant has the right to show that a victim-witness 
has made a prior false criminal accusation for the purpose of challenging that witness’s 
credibility.79  
The court outlined the proper procedure for determining whether the evidence should be 
admitted as well as the relevant factors to consider, stressing that courts must ensure that 
“testimony on the subject does not become a second trial, eclipsing the trial of the crimes 
charged.”80  The court emphasized that its ruling was not creating a new rule of evidence but 
carving out a narrow exception to N.J.R.E. 608 to allow for the introduction of relevant evidence 
that may affect jurors’ estimation of the credibility of a key witness.81  Thus, the court concluded, 
this limited exception will enhance the “fairness and truth-seeking function of a trial,”82 and is 
consistent with the rationale underpinning the rule.83  Guenther illustrates New Jersey’s current 
formulation of the rule with the now-added exception.  Moreover, Guenther summarized the 
continuing rationale for maintaining the bar on specific instances of conduct but also outlined the 
circumstances that would render the rule and its underlying policies no longer necessary.  
                                                 
78 Id. at 151–54.  
79 Guenther, 181 N.J. at 154, 156 (noting that the holding is limited to “criminal case[s] that involve[] the 
impeachment of a victim-witness whose credibility was the central issue in the case”).  The exception recognized by 
the court here is reflected in N.J.R.E. 608(b):  
The credibility of a witness in a criminal case may be attacked by evidence that the witness made a prior 
false accusation against any person of a crime similar to the crime with which defendant is charged if the 
judge preliminarily determines, by a hearing pursuant to Rule 104(a), that the witness knowingly made the 
prior false accusation. 
80 Guenther, 181 N.J. at 157.   
81 Id. at 159.  
82 Id.   
83 Id. at 154.  
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III. Majority Approach to Impeachment of a Witness’s Character for Truthfulness Through 
Specific Instances of Conduct 
This Part turns to the majority approach regarding specific conduct evidence in the context 
of attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness and how the rule is applied.  FRE 608(b) is 
representative of the majority approach.  A majority of states follow the federal approach and 
permit cross-examination into specific instances of conduct if they are probative of the witness’s 
character for truthfulness.84   
FRE 608 envisions three ways of showing that a witness is by character or disposition 
either truthful or untruthful: (1) by testimony as to reputation;85 (2) by testimony in the form of 
opinion;86 and (3) by evidence of specific instances of conduct.87  With respect to specific instances 
of conduct, FRE 608(b) uses the verb “may” in this setting, making it clear that the matter is left 
                                                 
84 Ten states use the language from the current version of FRE 608(b) as amended in 2011.  See ARIZ. R. 
EVID. 608(b); IOWA R. EVID. 608(b); ME. R. EVID. 608(b); MISS. R. EVID. 608(b); N.H. R. EVID. 608(b); N.M. R. 
EVID. 11–608(B); N.D. R. EVID. 608(b); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19–19–608(b) (2016); UTAH R. EVID. 608(b); W. 
VA. R. EVID. 608(b).  Six states use the language from the version of FRE 608(b) as amended in 2003.  See COLO. R. 
EVID. 608(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-608(b) (2013); MINN. R. EVID. 608(b); OHIO R. EVID. 608(B); TENN. R. 
EVID. 608(b); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 906.08(2) (2018).  Sixteen states use the language from the original 1975 version.  
See ARK. R. EVID. 608(b); DEL. R. EVID. 608(b); IDAHO R. EVID. 608(b); KY. R. EVID. 608(b); MICH. R. 
EVID. 608(b); MT. R. REV. Rule 608(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-608(2) (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.085(3) (1975); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 608(b) (1983); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2608(B) (1978); R.I. R. EVID. 608(b); S.C. R. 
EVID. 608(b); VT. R. EVID. 608(b); WASH. R. EVID. 608(b); WYO. R. EVID. 608(b).  Six states adopted only the latter 
part of the rule, FRE 608(b)(2);  they permit cross-examination of a character witness with specific instances of 
conduct about the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of the underlying witness.  See ALA. R. 
EVID. 608(b); ALASKA R. EVID. 608(b); IND. R. EVID. 608(b); LA. CODE EVID. ART. 608(B); PA. R. 
EVID. 608(b); VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:608.  Connecticut also follows the federal approach.  CONN. CODE EVID. 6–6(b).  
Maryland also allows cross-examination about a witness’s prior conduct that is probative of untruthfulness, when 
the questioner, if challenged, “establishes a reasonable factual basis” outside the jury’s presence.  MD. R. 5-608(b).  
Hawaii permits cross-examination about specific instances of a witness’s conduct, if probative of 
untruthfulness, and affords judges discretion to allow the use of extrinsic evidence.  HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-608(b) 
(1993).  Kansas allows any party to “introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any conduct by [the witness] and any 
other matter relevant upon the issues of credibility.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-420 (1963).  California permits 
evidence of specific instances of conduct to challenge a witness’s credibility in criminal but not civil cases.  See 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; CAL. EVID. CODE § 787; People v. Harris, 767 P.2d 619, 640–41 (Cal. 1989). 
85 FED. R. EVID. 608(a). 
86 Id. 
87 FED. R. EVID. 608(b). 
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to the discretion of the court.88  This raises two questions: (a) what general considerations govern 
a court’s exercise of discretion under subdivision; and (b) when is specific-instances evidence 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness?89  
A. What Governs the Court’s Exercise of Discretion? 
While the current text of subdivision (b) provides no guidance, an early version of that 
provision stated that FRE 403 and FRE 611 supply the governing principles.90   Drafters eventually 
removed from the text this reference to FRE 403 and FRE 611; however, as indicated in the 
Advisory Committee notes, the revision did not render those rules irrelevant to the 
analysis.91  Accordingly, the courts recognize that FRE 403 and FRE 611 identify the principles 
controlling the exercise of discretion under FRE 608(b).92  Under those rules, the court’s job is to 
balance the probative value of specific-instances evidence against the potential dangers and costs 
of that evidence.93  
Some of the general factors courts consider in this analysis are: (1) whether the witness’s 
testimony is crucial or unimportant, (2) the relevancy of the act of misconduct to truthfulness, (3) 
the nearness or remoteness of the misconduct to the time of trial, (4) whether the matter inquired 
into is likely to lead to time-consuming, distracting explanations on cross-examination or re-
                                                 
88 Id. (“But the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character 
for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
89 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 4, § 6118.   
90 Id. § 6111. 
91 FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory committee’s notes (“[T]he overriding protection of Rule 403 requires that probative 
value not be outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, and that of Rule 
611 bars harassment and undue embarrassment.”).  
92 See United States v. Seymour, 472 F.3d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Rule 608(b) is explicit that the determination of 
whether to allow specific instances of conduct to be used to challenge a witness’s reputation for truthfulness is 
committed to the discretion of the district judge, and Rule 403 establishes the standard for the exercise of the judge’s 
discretion in evidentiary matters . . . .”). 
93 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 4, § 6118; see also FED. R. EVID. 403 (“[T]he court may exclude relevant evidence if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.”); United States v. Saunders, 166 F.3d 907, 920 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding probative value of evidence 
concerning character for veracity must outweigh danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading jury).  
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examination, and (5) whether there will be unfair humiliation of the witness and undue prejudice 
to the party which called the witness.94  It is further recognized that courts have broad discretion 
in making this determination and a trial judge’s ruling can be overturned only on a finding of abuse 
of discretion.95   
For example, in United States v. Bunchan, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in limiting inquiry into specific instances of conduct on cross-
examination.96  The defendant sought to cross-examine a government witness about criminal 
charges that were currently pending against him for indecent assault and battery of a child.97  The 
defendant argued that the inquiry was permissible under FRE 608(b) as a specific instance of prior 
conduct relevant to the witness’s character for truthfulness.98  The trial court permitted the 
defendant to elicit, through cross-examination of the witness, that there were state court charges 
currently pending against him.99  But the trial court ordered that he could not inquire into the nature 
of the charges, finding such an inquiry “far too prejudicial under FRE 403.”100  
The Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s restriction of the 
cross-examination of the witness.101  Citing FRE 403, the Court of Appeals noted that the ruling 
                                                 
94 CHARLES T MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §41, at 93 (5th ed. 1999); see also United States v. 
Leake, 642 F.2d 715, 719 (4th Cir. 1981) (“[P]roper factors to be employed in measuring the scope of cross-
examination [are]: the importance of the testimony to the government’s case, the relevance of the conduct to the 
witness’s truthfulness, and the danger of prejudice, confusion, or delay raised by evidence sought to be adduced.”); 
Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 839 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding the probative value of evidence 
that one of the defendant’s agents embezzled $40,000 in connection with the plaintiff’s lease was greatly 
outweighed by risk of unfair prejudice). 
95 See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 4-608 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 608.02c (2017); see 
also United States v. Ortiz, 5 F.3d 288, 290–91 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding no abuse of discretion in excluding, as 
irrelevant, personnel file of government agent offered for impeachment and finding that Rule 608(b) expressly 
provided that instances of conduct may be inquired into on cross-examination “in the discretion of the court” and 
that the “district court has broad discretion in assessing admissibility of any evidence”). 
96 580 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 2009).   
97 Id.  
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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allowed defendant to raise the possibility that the witness would receive lighter treatment on the 
state charges if he testified favorably for the government.102  The Court of Appeals found, however, 
that exposing the nature of the pending state charges was not necessary to present such evidence.103  
Further, the Court of Appeals noted that FRE 608(b) only permits inquiry into prior conduct if the 
conduct is probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.104  The Court of 
Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that “the nature of the 
sexual assault charges was not sufficiently probative of [the witness’s] character for truthfulness 
to outweigh the serious danger of prejudicing the jury against him . . . .”105   
Bunchan illustrates the role of FRE 403 in the determination of whether inquiry into 
specific instances of conduct on cross-examination will be permitted.  This approach allows judges 
to balance the interests on both sides and take into account particular facts and circumstances of 
the case before the court.  Moreover, as in this case, it allows judges to admit the evidence where 
it is probative of a witness’s character for truthfulness but can limit the inquiry so as to preclude 
any of the dangers listed in FRE 403.  
B. What Conduct is Probative of Truthfulness? 
FRE 608(b) provides that a court may allow specific instances of conduct “if they are 
probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.”106  The critical question, therefore, 
is what kinds of conduct are probative of truthfulness.  Courts have taken three basic approaches 
to determining whether certain conduct is relevant to the witness’s character for truthfulness.107  
Under a broad view, virtually any conduct indicating bad character relates to untruthfulness.108  
                                                 
102 Bunchan, 580 F.3d at 71.   
103 Id.   
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 FED. R. EVID. 608. 
107 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 6:33 (Thomson/West 4th ed.). 
108 Id. 
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Under the middle view, “behavior seeking personal advantage by taking from others in violation 
of their rights” may be admissible if committed under circumstances reflecting on veracity.109  
Under the narrow view, conduct is admissible only if it directly involves falsehood or deception, 
such as forgery or perjury.110  
Under the broad view, the expansive scope of possible acts that indicate bad behavior opens 
up the witness’s entire life to probing, leaving the witness vulnerable to embarrassment and 
abuse.111  Moreover, the indirect inferences on which the veracity argument depends are too weak 
to justify this approach.112  Recognizing these difficulties and potential for abuse, virtually no 
modern decisions seem to take this view.113  Most courts tend to fall in either the middle view or 
narrow view as they recognize the dangers the broad view presents and insist on closer links 
between the conduct and veracity.114 
In United States v. Manske, the Court of Appeals had to decide whether FRE 
608(b) allowed cross-examination concerning a witness’s threats of violence which were intended 
to influence the truthfulness of other witness’s testimony against him.115  The trial court did not 
permit inquiry into the instances of conduct, holding that such evidence was irrelevant.116  The 
trial court noted that FRE 608(b) did not allow the use of the threat evidence to cross-examine the 
witness because such evidence did not go to character for truthfulness, “but rather, to the character 
for violence and [the witness’s] threatening nature.”117  
                                                 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 107, § 6:33. 
114 Id.   
115 186 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 1999). 
116 Id. at 774.  
117 Id. 
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals began by discussing the three approaches in determining 
whether this conduct was probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.118  The Court of Appeals 
ultimately adopted the middle view.119  The court explained that under this view specific act 
evidence is admissible when, although “the specific instance of conduct may not facially appear 
relevant to truthfulness, closer inspection reveals that it bears on the issue.”120  The Court of 
Appeals noted that this more flexible standard under the middle view is a wise approach.121  This 
standard allows questions that would not be embraced by the narrow view, which precludes 
evidence that may not facially appear to be relevant to truthfulness.122   
Applying this approach, the Court of Appeals found that FRE 608(b) did not limit inquiry 
only to conduct involving fraud or deceit, but permits cross-examination into “acts that reflect 
adversely on a person’s honesty and integrity.”123  Thus, the court held that “threatening to cause 
physical harm to a person who proposes to testify against you is . . . probative of truthfulness.”124  
The Court of Appeals noted that the trial court construed the threat evidence too narrowly by 
perceiving the threats as probative only of violence.125  The violent conduct, however, was a proper 
subject of inquiry on cross-examination because under the circumstances the threatening conduct 
was aimed at concealing or distorting the truth, thus implicating the witness’s truthfulness.126 
While these categories have been recognized, courts generally confine their analyses to the 
specific conduct raised before them and assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether the conduct is 
                                                 
118 Id. at 775.  
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121Manske, 186 F.3d at 775. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 776. 
126 Id. 
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probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.127  For example, the Court of Appeals in United States 
v. Leake considered whether the trial court erred by refusing to permit defense counsel to question 
a witness on cross-examination concerning various fraudulent financial schemes.128  In interpreting 
the scope of FRE 608 and more specifically, what matters can be raised on cross-examination, the 
Court of Appeals found that FRE 608 “authorizes inquiry only into instances of misconduct that 
are ‘clearly probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness,’ such as perjury, fraud, swindling, forgery, 
bribery, and embezzlement.”129   
The Court of Appeals held that the conduct defense counsel sought to expose was probative 
of the witness’s truthfulness.130  The witness’s conduct included obtaining money under false 
pretenses, defrauding an innkeeper, various checks drawn by the witness that had been returned 
for insufficient funds, numerous default judgments that had been entered against the witness in 
civil actions seeking repayment of loans, and the witness, or firms that he controlled, had entered 
numerous contracts to build churches, received payment, but failed to complete the work under 
the contracts.131  The court concluded that such conduct “certainly establish[es] a pattern of 
fraudulent activity that, if revealed, would have placed [the witness’s] credibility in question.”132 
Further examples of particular conduct that many courts have concluded are probative of 
truthfulness or untruthfulness include conduct that consists of acts clearly implicating veracity 
                                                 
127 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 4, § 6118. 
128 642 F.2d 715, 718 (4th Cir. 1981). 
129 Id. (quoting 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 982 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)). 
130 Id. at 719. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
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such as insurance fraud,133 lying in court,134 tax fraud,135 using a false name or identity,136 lying 
repeatedly,137 lying on credit card application,138 lying on a job application,139 lying on a license 
application,140 bank fraud,141 and bribery.142  Conversely, courts have generally found that 
conduct is not probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness where the conduct consisted of marital 
                                                 
133 See United States v. Amahia, 825 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding cross-examination concerning 
specific facts of insurance fraud). 
134 See United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“Nothing could be more probative of a 
witness’s character for untruthfulness than evidence that the witness has previously lied under oath.”). 
135 See Chnapkova v. Koh, 985 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding evidence that witness had not filed tax returns for 
eight years was a proper subject on cross-examination as it bore directly on her credibility as a witness). 
136 See United States v. Mansaw, 714 F.2d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 1983) (“A witness’ use of false names or false 
identities is a proper subject of cross-examination under [FRE] 608.”); United States v. Reid, 634 F.2d 469, 473 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (affirming cross-examination about statements made in a letter in which the witness admitted to falsifying 
his name, his occupation, and the name of his business). 
137 See United States v. Jones, 900 F.2d 512, 520–21 (2d Cir.1990) (affirming cross-examination regarding false 
statements on applications for employment, apartment, driver’s license, loan, and membership in an association). 
138 See United States v. Sperling, 726 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that it was proper for the government to 
cross-examine a witness regarding his false credit card applications to show a general lack of credibility).  
139 See United States v. Howard, 774 F.2d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming inquiry on cross-examination 
regarding false statements the witness made on two employment applications because the witness’s honesty or lack 
thereof on the applications was “plainly probative of his character for truthfulness”). 
140 See United States v. Carlin, 698 F.2d 1133, 1137 (11th Cir. 1983) (permitting cross-examination of witness as to 
the truthfulness of his answer on his verified application for used car dealer licenses). 
141 See United States v. Chevalier, 1 F.3d 581, 584 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding cross-examination into alleged bank 
fraud was proper because such conduct constitutes specific instances of conduct probative of truthfulness). 
142 See United States v. Wilson, 985 F.2d 348, 352 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming cross-examination regarding prior acts 
of bribery because bribery is probative of a witness’s character for truthfulness).  
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infidelity,143 prostitution,144 drug-related acts,145 domestic abuse,146 child abuse,147 violent 
crimes,148 arson,149 murder,150 parole violations,151 manslaughter,152 and assault.153 
Thus, whether conduct is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness is largely left to the 
discretion of the court.  Though, courts tend to look toward conduct that clearly speaks to 
veracity and if presented with conduct that is not on its face probative of veracity, will evaluate 
the evidence in light of the circumstances to determine whether the conduct, upon closer 
inspection, bears on the question of veracity.154 
                                                 
143 See United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1290 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding a letter husband sent to female 
neighbor asking to meet up may suggest he “was not being entirely candid with his wife,” but it does not “directly 
relate to [the witness’s] truthfulness and honesty”); United States v. Thiongo, 344 F.3d 55, 60 (1st Cir. 
2003) (evidence that the witness bore one man’s child while married to another was not probative of untruthfulness). 
144 See United States v. Smith, 831 F.2d 657, 661 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing FED. R. EVID. 608(b)) (holding no abuse of 
discretion in not permitting questions on cross-examination that witness dressed as a prostitute or engaged in 
prostitution as it would have little relevance to her credibility as a witness). 
145 See Elliott v. Aspen Brokers, Ltd., 811 F. Supp. 586, 590 (D. Colo. 1993) (holding that evidence that a witness 
had been allegedly involved in past drug activity would not be admitted to challenge witness’s character for 
truthfulness because “courts generally agree that a witness’ past drug activity is not probative of his character for 
truthfulness”); United States v. Pickard, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (D. Kan. 2002) (“Drug use is not admissible 
under Rule 608(b) because it is not probative of truthfulness.”).  
146 See Miller v. United States, 135 F.3d 1254, 1256 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding trial court’s decision to deny inquiry 
into instances of domestic violence because such acts are not probative of a witness’s propensity for truthfulness).  
147 See Starling v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 203 F.R.D. 468, 484 (D. Kan. 2001) (finding evidence of prior charge of 
child abuse which did not result in a conviction was not a proper subject on cross-examination under FRE 608(b)).  
148 See United States v. Parker, 133 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding violent crimes are irrelevant to a 
witness’s character for truthfulness); United States v. Pena, 978 F. Supp. 2d 254, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (prohibiting 
cross-examination about a witness’s violent acts toward women and finding no reason to depart from the “general 
rule” that evidence of acts relating to violence are properly excluded as having insufficient bearing on a witness’s 
credibility). 
149 See United States v. Cudlitz, 72 F.3d 992, 996 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[Witness] might have been cross-examined under 
Rule 608(b) as to prior instances of forgery or perjury; but soliciting arson, although showing bad character 
generally, is not ‘probative of . . . untruthfulness.’”).  
150 See United States v. Barrett, 766 F.2d 609, 615 (1st Cir. 1985) (finding no abuse of discretion in refusing to allow 
cross-examination of witness concerning pending murder charge under FRE 608(b)); United States v. Ramirez-
Rivera, 800 F.3d 1, 43 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding no abuse of discretion in prohibiting inquiry into specific details of 
murder as they do not tell anything of the witness’s tendency to be truthful). 
151 See United States v. Tomaiolo, 249 F.2d 683, 689 (2d Cir. 1957) (finding violation of the terms of the defendant-
witness’s parole was not an offense relevant to his credibility). 
152 See United States v. Pickard, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1293 (D. Kan. 2002) (finding a charge of manslaughter and 
events surrounding it inadmissible under FRE 608(b) because they are not probative of the witness’s veracity). 
153 See United States v. Lamb, 99 F. App’x 843, 847 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent more specific allegations, mere 
assault does not impugn a witness’s credibility . . . .”). 
154 See also Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“A ‘rule of thumb’ thus should be that 
convictions which rest on dishonest conduct relate to credibility whereas those of violent or assaultive crimes 
generally do not . . . .”). 
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C. Prohibition of Extrinsic Evidence 
Although FRE 608(b) permits inquiry on cross-examination about specific instances of 
conduct, the rule expressly prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to prove such conduct occurred 
in order to attack or support a witness’s character for truthfulness.155  Extrinsic evidence is 
evidence offered through documents or other witnesses, rather than elicited from cross-
examination of the witness himself or herself.156  For example, in United States v. Mangiameli, the 
Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court erred in excluding portions of the proffered 
testimony of a defense witness offered to impeach the veracity of a prosecution witness.157  The 
defense witness would have testified regarding specific instances of the untruthfulness under oath 
by the prosecution witness.158   
The Court of Appeals found that evidence of multiple instances of lying under oath was 
calculated to prove the prosecution witness’s general character for veracity thus, subject to the 
restrictions of FRE 608(b).159  The court further noted that the provisions of FRE 608(b) provide 
that specific instances of a witness’s conduct, for the purpose of attacking his character for 
truthfulness, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.160  Therefore, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the defense may have inquired into the specific instances of conduct to attack the 
prosecution witness’s character for truthfulness upon cross-examination of that witness.161  But, 
                                                 
155 FED. R. EVID. 608(b); see United States v. Perez-Perez, 72 F.3d 224, 227 (1st Cir. 1995) (“The notion underlying 
the rule is that while certain prior good or bad acts of a witness may constitute character evidence bearing on 
veracity, they are not evidence of enough force to justify the detour of extrinsic proof.”). 
156 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 95, § 608.20[c]; see also United States v. Boulerice, 325 F.3d 75, 82 n.5 (1st 
Cir. 2003) (explaining testimony elicited under cross-examination is not “extrinsic”  and evidence “is ‘extrinsic’ if 
offered through documents or other witnesses, rather than through cross-examination of the witness himself or 
herself”). 
157 668 F.2d 1172, 1175–76 (10th Cir. 1982).   
158 Id. at 1175. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 1176.  
161 Id. 
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by seeking to introduce the specific conduct evidence through the testimony of another witness, 
the defense attempted to attack the prosecution witness’s character for truthfulness by extrinsic 
evidence of conduct, “which is forbidden by Rule 608(b).”162  Therefore, the Court of Appeals 
held that the evidence was properly excluded.163  
Moreover, the prohibition on extrinsic evidence means that once counsel asks the witness 
about the specific instance of conduct, counsel is “bound by the witness’s answer.”164  And if the 
witness denies the conduct, counsel may not introduce any further evidence, by way of calling 
another witness or introducing physical evidence, to prove the witness committed the act.165  In 
this way FRE 608(b) gives meaning to the adage that the questioner must “take the answer of the 
witness.”166  For example, in United States v. Goings, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court 
had discretion to exclude written evidence that a government witness failed to repay the entire 
advance from her next paycheck.167  The Court of Appeals explained that FRE 608(b) allows cross-
examination about specific instances of conduct that concern the witness’s character for 
truthfulness, “but forbids the introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove the specific bad act 
occurred.”168  Therefore, after the witness specifically denied that she had ever failed to fully repay 
a payroll advance from her next paycheck, “the defendants could not introduce extrinsic evidence 
to contradict her.”169  
                                                 
162 Id.   
163 Mangiameli, 668 F.2d at 1176.   
164 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 95, § 608.22[1]; see also United States v. Martinez, 76 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (holding if a witness denies making a particular statement on collateral matter, the examiner may not 
introduce extrinsic evidence to prove that witness did in fact make that statement); United States v. Corbin, 734 F.2d 
643, 654 (11th Cir. 1984) (excluding evidence that government witness shot someone after he denied it on cross, 
because such evidence “falls squarely within Rule 608,” which limits inquiry to questions on cross). 
165 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 107, § 6:36. 
166 Id.; see also United States v. Matthews, 168 F.3d 1234, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999) (concluding if the witness denies 
conduct, it may not be proved by extrinsic evidence and the questioning party must take the witness’s answer). 
167 313 F.3d 423, 426–27 (8th Cir. 2002). 
168 Id. at 427.  
169 Id. 
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IV. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Majority Approach to Impeachment of a Witness’s 
Character for Truthfulness Through Specific Instances of Conduct 
A. Dangers in Allowing Inquiry into Specific Instances of Conduct 
 While character evidence may be relevant on the question whether a witness is testifying 
truthfully, the use of such evidence may cause problems with judicial administration and 
unfairness to the parties.170  In fact, it has been suggested that a complete bar on the use of 
specific instances of conduct to attack a witness’s character for truthfulness may be the 
preferable approach “given the dangers of prejudice (particularly if the witness is a party), of 
distraction and confusion, of abuse by asking unfounded questions, and the difficulties of 
determining whether particular acts relate to character for truthfulness.”171 
 In his concurring opinion in State v. Scott, Justice Albin illustrated these problems and 
noted that this form of impeachment has been prohibited because “the probative value of such 
questioning is outweighed by the potential prejudice of diverting jurors from the central issues in 
a case.”172  Moreover, Justice Albin explained that the threat of collateral attacks regarding 
specific instances that are “wholly unrelated to the litigation” could keep crime victims from 
coming forward and injury victims from bringing their claims.173  Such a threat might also deter 
defendants from taking the stand, thus depriving the jury of their testimony.174  And finally, 
                                                 
170 See Victor Gold, Two Jurisdictions, Three Standards: The Admissibility of Misconduct Evidence to Impeach, 36 
SW. U. L. REV. 769, 770–79 (2008) (discussing benefits and costs of misconduct impeachment, focusing on the 
adverse effect such evidence has on accurate fact finding, the tendency to encourage witness harassment, and 
potential for undue delay); 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 979, at 826 (2d ed. 
1940) (“[E]ach additional witness introduces the entire group of questions as to his qualifications and his 
impeachment, and the amount of new evidence thus made possible may increase in far greater than geometrical 
proportion to the number of new witnesses, so that the trial may become in length extremely protracted, and with 
relatively little profit . . . th[e] additional mass of testimony on minor points tends to overwhelm the material issues 
of the case and to confuse the tribunal.”). 
171 MCCORMICK, supra note 94, §41, at 92.  
172 State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 495 (2017) (Albin, J., concurring).  
173 Id. 
174 Id.  
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parties would be encouraged to forage for impeachment evidence to launch wide-ranging attacks 
on a witness’s credibility.175 
 One of the general dangers presented by specific instances of conduct is the potential to 
confuse or distract the jury from the substantive issues being tried.176  Evidence of specific acts is 
usually not relevant to the issues being tried, which can create a danger of confusion for the 
jury.177  In addition, whether a jury is able to limit its consideration of character evidence to the 
character evidence’s effect on the witness’s credibility, even after instruction, is doubtful.178  
More concerning is when the witness is a party, which makes the ramifications of this prejudicial 
effect especially serious.  In a criminal case, this exposes a testifying defendant to the danger that 
the jury may believe that the defendant is a bad person deserving of punishment, regardless of 
whether he or she committed the offense.179  
 Misconduct evidence also raises questions concerning the appropriate treatment of 
witnesses. Such evidence creates potential for unfairness and embarrassment.180  Wigmore 
suggested that imposing limits on misconduct evidence was compelled by common decency: 
“[T]he ruthless flaying of personal character in the witness box is not only cowardly—because 
there is no escape for the victim—and brutal—because it inflicts the pain of public exposure of 
misdeeds to idle bystanders—but it has often not the slightest justification of necessity.”181  
                                                 
175 Id.  
176 See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 4, § 6112 (“Evidence of witness character also can undermine the integrity of 
jury decision-making by distracting the jury from the issues in the case and inducing a decision on an improper basis.”).  
177 See id. (“[U]nlike evidence of bias or prior inconsistent statements, evidence concerning witness character bears 
no specific link to the facts or parties in a case.”); see also United States v. Perez-Perez, 72 F.3d 224, 227 (1st Cir. 
1995) (finding that evidence of police officer’s misconduct was not material to defendant’s guilt or innocence). 
178 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 95, § 608.02[2]; see also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) 
(“The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, all practicing lawyers 
know to be unmitigated fiction.”) (citation omitted). 
179 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 103, § 6:34; see also WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 4, § 6112 (“[W]hen the 
jury receives evidence that a witness is a bad man, it may be inclined to punish the party associated with that witness.”). 
180 Gold, supra note 170, at 778. 
181 Id. (citing 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 979, at 826 (Chadbourn rev., 1970)).  
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Potential for unfair surprise to a witness is present because opposing counsel can forage through 
a witness’s past and inquire into any conduct from the witness’s life that may bear on 
truthfulness.182  This presents an unfair challenge as witnesses cannot be expected to defend 
against every aspect of their lives, thus increasing the chances a witness “will be surprised by, 
and unprepared to respond to, totally unfounded charges of misconduct.”183  Misconduct 
evidence also may deter witnesses from coming forward for fear of being publicly humiliated 
since witnesses may be subjected to an unrestrained public dissection of their character, thus 
depriving “justice of the fullest opportunity to obtain useful testimony.”184  
 Finally, each of these dangers all have the underlying possibility of causing undue 
delay.185  The potential for “mini-trials” and side-excursions into each witness’s past, which as 
noted above are usually not relevant to the substantive issues of the case, create a real danger of 
not only confusing the issues but prolonging the trial.186  There is also the possibility of a witness 
who, even though is being impeached, does not dispute the alleged misconduct but “may want to 
provide an explanation that diminishes its import or testify to other conduct that reveals the 
                                                 
182 See State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 498 (2017) (Albin, J., concurring) (“Under our current rule, we have concluded 
that it would not be fair that a witness must answer for his whole life and respond to long ago instances of untruthful 
conduct.”). 
183 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 4, § 6112; see also 3A WIGMORE, supra note 170, § 979, at 826 (“This unfairness 
here lies in the fact that the opponent who desired by other witnesses to impeach by particular instances of misconduct 
might allege them as of any time and place that he pleased, and that, in spite of the utter falsity of the allegations, it 
would be practically impossible for the witness to have ready at the trial competent persons who would demonstrate 
the falsity of allegations that might range over the whole scope of his life.”). 
184 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 95, § 608.02[2] (citing 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 921, at 724 (Chadbourn 
rev., 1970)); Gold, supra note 166, at 778 (“This ‘ruthless flaying’ can even undermine accurate fact-finding.  
Witnesses may be reluctant to come forward, and important evidence may be lost, when witnesses are to be 
subjected to in-court dissection of their character and past conduct.”).  
185 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 95, § 608.02[2]; Gold, supra note 166, at 778 (explaining that limits on the 
admissibility of misconduct evidence can be justified on the ground that such evidence has the potential to “burden a 
trial with distracting and time-consuming detours from the central issues”).  
186 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 4, § 6112 (“[W]ithout limits on admissibility, a case can dissolve into a series of mini-
trials examining the life history of each witness.  Such a process would distract and confuse the jury, thus undermining 
the fundamental goal of accurate fact-finding.”). 
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misconduct to be unrepresentative of her character.”187  Thus, further detracting from the main 
issues and spending prolonged time on collateral matters wholly unrelated to the case. 
B. Arguments for Using the Majority Approach to Impeachment of a Witness’s Character for 
Truthfulness Through Specific Instances of Conduct 
While the use of specific instances of conduct to attack a witness’s character presents 
various dangers, conscious awareness of these concerns provided the basis for crafting FRE 608.188 
Specific conduct evidence is not permitted wholesale and is subject to various limitations.  In his 
concurring opinion in State v. Scott, Chief Justice Rabner illustrated the benefits of the majority 
approach noting that there are safeguards put in place that protect against these concerns.189  In 
addition, Chief Justice Rabner emphasized that New Jersey’s current formulation shields witnesses 
from being questioned about specific conduct that bears directly on credibility and thus has the 
effect of presenting witnesses to the jury “under an artificial light.”190  Therefore, the majority 
approach as represented by FRE 608 is crafted in a way to alleviate the dangers outlined in the 
previous section and gives equal weight to the competing concern of impeding the search for the 
truth.191  
First, the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence recognized the potential for abuse and 
dangers, thus the rule was crafted to address the dangers of permitting specific conduct evidence.192  
The Advisory Committee Notes to subdivision (b) provide, “[e]ffective cross-examination 
demands that some allowance be made for going into matters of this kind, but the possibilities of 
abuse are substantial.  Consequently, safeguards are erected in the form of specific requirements . 
                                                 
187 Gold, supra note 160, at 779 (quoting 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 983, at 841(Chadbourn rev., 1970)). 
188 FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory committee’s notes.  
189 State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 492–93 (2017) (Rabner, C.J., concurring).  
190 Id. at 487, 492.  
191 See id.  
192 FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee’s notes. 
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. . .”193  Those requirements include that the conduct be probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness.194  Moreover, the overriding protection of FRE 403 requires that probative value 
not be outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.195  
FRE 611 further bars harassment and undue embarrassment.196  In addition, FRE 608(b) is 
intended to be restrictive.197  In fact, the original rule was amended by Congress to ensure that it 
would be restrictively interpreted by trial courts.198  The rule does not authorize inquiry on cross-
examination into instances of conduct that do not actually indicate a lack of truthfulness.199  
One of the major limitations contained in FRE 608(b) is the prohibition on the use of 
extrinsic evidence.200  This limitation is designed to protect against undue delay as well as 
confusion of the issues.201  As explained above, when a witness is questioned about prior 
misconduct, counsel is “bound” by the witness’s answers and may not introduce extrinsic evidence 
to prove the misconduct.202  Thus, counsel may not call another witness or bring in other evidence 
to disprove a denial and show that the conduct occurred.203  It is recognized that absent the 
limitation, this process may amount to a considerable time expenditure that could lead to time 
                                                 
193 Id.  
194 Id. 
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197 See United States v. Manske, 186 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that FRE 608(b) is “a rule of limited 
admissibility”); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 107, § 6:29 (“[T]he focus of Rule 608 is not on credibility in 
[a] broad sense[], but on the aspect of credibility that we describe as ‘character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.’”).  
198 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 103, § 6:29 (explaining that FRE 608(b) was amended in 2003 resulting in 
the word “credibility” being deleted and replaced with “character for truthfulness”).  
199 Id. 
200 FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (“[E]xtrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in 
order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness.”).  
201 See State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 494 (2017) (Rabner, C.J., concurring); see also United States v. Simmons, 444 
F. Supp. 500, 507 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (finding FRE 608(b) excludes extrinsic evidence “to avoid minitrials on wholly 
collateral matters which tend to distract and confuse the jury”). 
202 See supra pp. 22–23. 
203 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 95, § 608.22[1]; see also United States v. Martinez, 76 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (holding if a witness denies making a particular statement on a collateral matter, the examiner may not 
introduce extrinsic evidence to prove that the witness did in fact make that statement). 
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consuming “mini trials” on collateral issues.204  This concern illustrates the principal purpose of 
this safeguard—to limit the time spent on issues that are not central to the case and to maintain the 
focus of the trial on substantive issues and matters bearing directly on credibility.205  In addition, 
it reduces the risk of unfair prejudice that accompanies inquiry into behavior bearing on 
untruthfulness since such behavior is likely to consist of some form of negative conduct and juries 
are likely to misuse the evidence, especially if the witness is a party.206  
In sum, as explained by Chief Justice Rabner, the bar against extrinsic evidence alleviates 
the possible dangers from inquiry into specific instances of conduct for two reasons.  First, “[t]here 
is no danger of confusion of issues, because the matter stops with question and answer.”207  Second, 
“[t]here is no danger of unfair surprise, because the impeached witness is not obliged to be ready 
with other witnesses to answer the extrinsic testimony of the opponent, for there is none to be 
answered . . . .”208  Thus, many of the major concerns that come with permitting inquiry into 
specific instances of conduct are addressed and properly limited by the prohibition against extrinsic 
evidence.  
In addition, FRE 608(b) is also subject to FRE 403 and FRE 611 as further safeguards to 
bar testimony that would confuse the issues, distract the jury, or cause undue prejudice or 
harassment.209  As explained above, the text of the rule leaves to the judge’s discretion the 
determination of whether or not to allow inquiry into specific instances of conduct.210  The judge 
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must consider whether the conduct is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.  Moreover, the 
overriding requirements of FRE 403 require a judge to balance the issues and ensure that the 
determination is guided by the understanding that such evidence can have a detrimental effect on 
the parties and the policies and goals of the justice system.  
United States v. Shinderman provides an illustration of the careful balancing process that 
courts employ.211  In this case, the Court of Appeals had to determine whether the trial court abused 
its discretion in permitting the government, on cross-examination, to question the defendant about 
his responses to questions when applying for a medical license.212  The defendant applied for a 
medical license in 2001 and 2002.213  On each application, he answered “no” to a question asking 
whether he had ever “been charged, summonsed, indicted, arrested or convicted of any criminal 
offense . . . .”214  The government had evidence that defendant had been arrested twice for drug-
related offenses, although neither arrest culminated in a conviction.215  
The government wanted to cross-examine defendant regarding the applications, seeking to 
cast doubt upon his truthfulness.216  The defendant objected and moved to exclude any such 
inquiry.217  He admitted that he had been arrested, but asserted that the arrests had been expunged 
and therefore, he had answered the questions truthfully and on the advice of counsel.218  Defendant 
offered an affidavit from his counsel to support this contention.219  The trial court concluded that 
the affidavit “provided ‘no convincing ground’ to support the defendant’s belief that the arrests 
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had vanished” and did not have to be disclosed on the applications.220  Then, in the exercise of its 
discretion, the trial court ruled that the government could cross-examine defendant about his arrest-
related answers.221  The trial court precluded the government from introducing the arrest records 
themselves into evidence.222  
In assessing this ruling, the Court of Appeals noted that a judge’s discretion in determining 
the scope of cross-examination is subject to the “overarching need to balance probative worth 
against prejudicial impact.”223  The court found no abuse of discretion and emphasized that a 
witness’s willingness to lie to the government in an application for a license is highly probative of 
his character for truthfulness.224  Moreover, the court noted that temporal considerations weighed 
in favor of permitting the evidence since defendant’s answers were “not remote in time but, rather, 
were roughly contemporaneous” with the criminal conduct charged.225  Finally, the central factual 
issue at trial revolved around the defendant’s intent, making his credibility highly relevant to the 
outcome of the case.226   
After determining that the misconduct evidence could be a matter for cross-examination 
under the requirements of FRE 608(b), the court then addressed the question of prejudice.227  The 
court noted that revelation of prior arrests carried some potential for adverse effect, however, 
ultimately concluded that the effect was not particularly inflammatory or of such detriment to 
compel exclusion of the evidence.228  Also relevant to this determination, the court noted, was the 
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affirmative steps the trial court took to minimize any risk of unfair prejudice.229  The trial court 
did not permit the government to elicit any unnecessary or tawdry details regarding the arrests.230 
The trial court allowed the defendant to tell the jury about the ultimate disposition of the arrests 
and about his belief that they had been expunged.231  Furthermore, the trial court offered to give a 
limiting instruction.232   
This case highlights the arguments in favor of the majority approach and illustrates all of 
the factors properly taken into account by judges when determining whether cross-examination 
into specific instances of conduct is appropriate.  Further, the case demonstrates that this role given 
to judges is not taken lightly and the rule requires in-depth balancing which serves to alleviate and 
account for the possible dangers from the use of specific instances of conduct.  
C. Counterarguments to the Use of the Majority Approach to Impeachment of a Witness’s 
Character for Truthfulness Through Specific Instances of Conduct 
 While the federal rule was crafted with these dangers in mind, it is argued that the 
limitations in FRE 608(b) and the other rules of evidence will not provide adequate safeguards 
needed to prevent these dangers, and in some cases actually serve to create additional concerns. 
As explained by Justice Albin in his concurring opinion in State v. Scott, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court has “determined that ‘wide-ranging collateral attacks on the general credibility of a witness’ 
may lead to jury confusion and distract the jury from ‘the true issues in the case.’”233  Justice Albin 
argued that these concerns are not diminished merely because extrinsic evidence cannot be 
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introduced.234 Justice Albin also cautioned that the only limitation guarding the expansive use of 
specific instances of conduct is Rule 403 which leaves all of the concerns and potential for danger 
within the discretion of trial judges.235  
 First, regarding the limitation on the use of extrinsic evidence, it is recognized that the 
exclusion of extrinsic evidence of specific conduct to impeach a witness’s character for 
truthfulness does not completely eliminate the danger of confusion and prejudice from inquiry into 
collateral matters “because the very question itself can convey the theoretically barred information 
to the jury.”236  Merely asking a question about a specific instance of misconduct and leaving with 
the jury only a bare denial from the witness can have prejudicial effects on the witness as well as 
allow the jury to engage in speculation on an issue that is collateral to the merits of the case.237  
 Moreover, the phrase “taking his or her answer” can be misleading because it can be 
understood as suggesting that the cross-examiner cannot continue pressing for an admission that 
the past conduct did occur.238  FRE 608(b), however, authorizes this procedure.239   Thus, while 
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counsel is “bound by the witness’s answer,” this merely means extrinsic evidence may not be 
introduced.240  Counsel may proceed, however, with questioning and continue pressing for 
admission, for instance, “by reminding the witness of the penalties for perjury.”241  This creates 
concern for undue harassment and still leaves open the threat of jury distraction and confusion 
pertaining to issues collateral to the merits of the case.242  
 Second, apart from the limitation on extrinsic evidence, the only safeguard on the 
expansive use of specific instances of conduct to attack a witness’s character for truthfulness is 
Rule 403.243  The concern with Rule 403 is that while it does take into account the dangers that are 
associated with cross-examination on specific instances of conduct, trial courts are given broad 
discretion to make this determination.244  Thus, all of these concerns are left in the hands of one 
judge and the determination cannot be overturned unless the reviewing court finds an abuse of 
discretion.245  It has been argued that the task of regulating prejudice delegated by Rule 403 
allocates broad power to trial judges to make individualized decisions about the relative 
importance of competing principles, and as such is “inconsistent with the general hierarchical 
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structure of our legal system.  Trial judges customarily exercise more limited, reviewable 
discretion within a framework of standards set by higher authority.”246 
 Moreover, as Justice Albin noted, even in cases involving similar conduct, different judges 
may come to different results when weighing the Rule 403 factors or when determining whether 
conduct is probative of truthfulness.247  Thus, it is argued, the admissibility of potentially damaging 
evidence is improperly left with the discretion of trial judges to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis that is subject to change and ultimately does not adequately address the concerns that arise 
when permitting inquiry into specific instances of conduct to attack a witness’s character.  
V. New Jersey’s Options to Address the Issue and Make Changes to the Current Rule 
While Justice Albin expressed valid concerns regarding the use of specific instances of 
conduct to impeach a witness’s character for truthfulness, a complete ban on any use of such 
evidence presents equally troubling concerns.  There are options to address the issues on both 
sides.  Allowing inquiry into past misconduct does have benefits.  While it is recognized that it 
can be difficult to point to past conduct and determine with any degree of certainty whether the 
witness is telling the truth or lying, credibility is a critical issue in every case.248  “Character 
evidence, despite its flaws, may still serve a purpose in calling to the jury’s attention what might 
be an otherwise unknown deficiency of the witness and thus give the jury a more adequate basis 
for judging his testimony.”249   
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Witnesses are often carefully prepped and coached by counsel to “project an in-court 
character which suggests a high level of credibility.”250  Evidence that reveals the true character of 
a witness can be used to “poke holes in this facade.”251  Moreover, witnesses may be inclined to 
testify truthfully because a lie may open them up to an attack on their character in court.252  Further, 
character evidence can act as a check on an attorney who may be tempted to offer testimony from 
an unreliable witness because that witness’s lack of credibility could be revealed by opposing 
counsel on cross-examination.253  Finally, admitting evidence regarding a witness’s character for 
truthfulness can advance accurate fact-finding (a basic policy goal of the evidence rules), because 
“just as a jury can be prejudiced against the plaintiff by the inclusion of some evidence, it can be 
misled by the exclusion of other evidence.”254 
In light of the costs and benefits of allowing specific instances of conduct to impeach a 
witness’s character for truthfulness and taking into account the arguments posed by both sides, it 
seems that New Jersey’s current formulation does not do enough to address all of the concerns.  
The case that ignited this debate between the justices highlights the problems with New Jersey’s 
current formulation.  Where the prosecutor had a good-faith basis to ask the question, what is 
wrong with asking a witness whether she had lied before to protect her son about a serious matter?  
Such an inquiry bears directly on the witness’s character for truthfulness.  As expressed by Chief 
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Justice Rabner, however, New Jersey’s approach shields witnesses from this type of inquiry and 
as a result impedes the search for truth and presents witnesses to the jury in an artificial light.255 
Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile why N.J.R.E. 608(b) allows evidence of a witness’s 
prior false criminal accusations but inquiry into a witness’s statements made to exonerate a person 
is prohibited.256   The New Jersey Supreme Court made clear in Guenther that its decision was not 
made “on constitutional grounds, but rather by making a narrow exception to N.J.R.E. 608 
consistent with the rationale of that rule.”257  Thus, the question remains as to what the logical 
difference is between a prior false accusation and a false statement to exonerate that allows for the 
disparate treatment under N.J.R.E. 608.  In addition, the exception to N.J.R.E. 608 that resulted 
from Guenther, now 608(b), allows “[t]he credibility of a witness in a criminal case [to] be attacked 
by evidence that the witness made a prior false accusation . . . .”258  This exception not only allows 
inquiry into specific instances of conduct but goes beyond the federal rule and does not prohibit 
the use of extrinsic evidence; rather it is left within the discretion of trial judge as to whether such 
evidence should be admitted.259  Thus it is difficult to understand why FRE 608(b) is disfavored 
when it provides a rule of limited admissibility, it protects against the dangers presented by specific 
instances of conduct, and does not go as far as N.J.R.E. 608(b) by prohibiting extrinsic evidence.   
The facts of State v. Scott provide a good example of how FRE 608(b) could be applied 
and avoid any of the concerns regarding the use of specific instances of conduct.  The State sought 
                                                 
255 State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 487, 492 (2017) (Rabner, C.J., concurring). 
256 Id. at 492–93 (“False testimony to exonerate is just as troublesome as a false criminal accusation.  Both impede 
the search for the truth.  Indeed, it is hard to explain to the public why one area can be probed and not the other.”). 
257 State v. Guenther, 181 N.J. 129, 154 (2004). 
258 N.J.R.E. 608(b) (emphasis added).  
259 Id.; see also Guenther, 181 N.J. at 157 (“Among the factors to be considered in deciding the issue of 
admissibility are . . . the number of witnesses, the items of extrinsic evidence, and the amount of time required for 
presentation of the issue at trial . . . .  If the court, pursuant to its gate-keeping role, determines that evidence of the 
prior false accusation is admissible, the court has the discretion to limit the number of witnesses who will testify 
concerning the matter at trial.”). 
 38 
to introduce evidence of two prior occasions on which the witness, Barbella, allegedly lied to 
police to exonerate her son, the defendant.260  Applying FRE 608(b), the trial judge would have 
the discretion to admit the evidence.  Whether such evidence could be permitted would be subject 
to Rule 403 and any testimony that would confuse the issues, distract the jury, or cause undue 
prejudice would not be permitted.  The majority in Scott, and Chief Justice Rabner in his 
concurring opinion, noted that there was a question concerning the prejudicial effect that could 
result from asking about this prior conduct because it reveals that the defendant had previously 
been in trouble with the police.261  The trial judge, however, could sanitize the evidence and only 
allow the State to ask whether Barbella had lied to the police to exonerate others in the past.  Thus, 
by removing the fact that she had lied to exonerate her son, the prejudice that could result against 
defendant is eliminated but the jury would still receive the information that relates to the witness’s 
character for untruthfulness.  In addition, if Barbella chose to deny that she had made those 
statements, the prosecutor, under FRE 608(b), would have to take the witness’s answer and no 
extrinsic evidence could come in to prove that Barbella engaged in the alleged conduct.   
Given this illustration and the competing concerns regarding specific instances of conduct, 
it would be beneficial for New Jersey to change N.J.R.E. 608(a) to align with the majority 
approach.  While the disadvantages outlined above do present valid concerns, New Jersey could 
use the federal rule as a starting point and craft a rule that will take into account the arguments and 
concerns expressed on both sides.  The states have created different ways to handle the use of 
specific instances of conduct with many taking a more restrictive approach.  For example, 
Tennessee’s rule, which follows a more restrictive approach, could be a framework for New Jersey 
to follow. 
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A. Tennessee Approach  
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides: 
Specific instances of conduct of a witness for the purpose of attacking or supporting 
the witness’s character for truthfulness, other than convictions of crime as provided 
in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.  They may, however, if 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness and under the following conditions, be 
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness concerning the witness’s 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness or concerning the character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which the character witness 
being cross-examined has testified.262  
 
Both FRE 608(b) and Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) allow for the impeachment of a witness 
by inquiring on cross-examination into specific instances of conduct that are probative of 
truthfulness or untruthfulness.263  Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) also does not permit the 
introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove the specific instance of conduct had occurred.264  
Tennessee, however, has a number of added procedural safeguards that are designed to prevent 
common types of abuse on cross-examination.265  Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) has three 
specific provisions that must be satisfied in order to use specific conduct evidence to attack a 
witness’s character for truthfulness: 
(1) The court upon request must hold a hearing outside the jury’s presence and must 
determine that the alleged conduct has probative value and that a reasonable factual 
basis exists for the inquiry; (2) The conduct must have occurred no more than ten 
years before commencement of the action or prosecution, but evidence of a specific 
instance of conduct not qualifying under this paragraph (2) is admissible if the 
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance notice of intent to use such 
evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of 
such evidence and the court determines in the interests of justice that the probative 
value of that evidence, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially 
outweighs its prejudicial effect; and (3) If the witness to be impeached is the 
accused in a criminal prosecution, the State must give the accused reasonable 
written notice of the impeaching conduct before trial, and the court upon request 
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must determine that the conduct’s probative value on credibility outweighs its 
unfair prejudicial effect on the substantive issues.  The court may rule on the 
admissibility of such proof prior to the trial but in any event shall rule prior to the 
testimony of the accused.  If the court makes a final determination that such proof 
is admissible for impeachment purposes, the accused need not actually testify at the 
trial to later challenge the propriety of the determination.266 
 
Tennessee also added a further restriction concerning juvenile conduct which has no comparable 
federal provision for such evidence.267  Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(c) provides:   
Evidence of specific instances of conduct of a witness committed while the witness 
was a juvenile is generally not admissible under this rule.  The court may, however, 
allow evidence of such conduct of a witness other than the accused in a criminal 
case if the conduct would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the 
court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination in 
a civil action or criminal proceeding.268 
 
Tennessee did not formally adopt the federal rule.  In State v. Morgan,269 the Tennessee 
Supreme Court incorporated FRE 608(b) into Tennessee case law.270  Thus, Tennessee Rule of 
Evidence 608(b) reflects the Tennessee Supreme Court’s view of impeachment by specific 
instances of conduct that attack a witness’s character for truthfulness.271  As a result the rule is 
even more specific than the federal version.272  
B. How New Jersey Can Incorporate Tennessee’s Rule to Address Justice Albin’s Concerns 
New Jersey has the capability of drafting a restrictive rule similar to Tennessee in order to 
fully address the concerns Justice Albin has expressed.  Similar to Tennessee, New Jersey can 
require a hearing to determine that a reasonable factual basis exists for cross-examining a witness 
about specific instances of conduct and whether the alleged conduct has probative value in 
assessing the credibility of the witness.  In addition, in criminal cases, the rule could require 
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counsel to give pretrial notice of intent to question a witness about misconduct, provide an 
evidentiary basis, and show that the probative worth outweighs unfair prejudice.273  This would 
expressly incorporate the requirements under Rule 403 into the language of the rule, make notice 
of the intent to use specific conduct evidence a requirement, and place a burden on the party 
seeking to admit such evidence to present specific facts and circumstances.   
Moreover, if still not satisfied by Rule 403, New Jersey could adopt an altered balancing 
test for courts to employ in making the determination regarding prejudice.  Minnesota, for 
example, in criminal cases, requires the court to employ a balancing test that “is not the Rule 403 
test favoring admissibility unless probative value is ‘substantially outweighed’ by unfair 
prejudice.”274  Rather, the rule incorporated the balancing test used by the court in State v. Fallin,275 
and under this test, “the court should not allow the cross-examination if probative value and unfair 
prejudice are closely balanced.”276  The evidence should not be allowed unless the prosecutor 
establishes that the probative value on the issue of credibility outweighs the potential for unfair 
prejudice.277  Thus, this rule would err on the side of exclusion if the prejudicial effect of the 
evidence is a closer call. 
New Jersey can adopt a time limit that declares certain actions after a specified number of 
years presumptively barred.  New Jersey could take this a step further and set a shorter time limit 
than the ten-year limit in Tennessee’s rule and add any further burdens on the party seeking to 
present such evidence.  New Jersey could also add further restrictions as deemed necessary like 
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Tennessee did by adding subsection (c) to its rule to address specific concerns in particular 
contexts.  Further, New Jersey could adopt restrictions and standards to help guide judges when 
making the determination to allow cross-examination into specific instances of conduct.  With 
regard to what conduct is probative of truthfulness, New Jersey can elect to take the narrow view 
which provides that conduct is admissible only if it directly involves falsehood or deception.  
VI. Conclusion 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Guenther explained that New Jersey bars 
“the use of prior instances of conduct to attack the credibility of a witness for two essential reasons: 
to prevent unfairness to the witness and to avoid confusion of the issues before the jury.”278  These 
goals, however, can be met by carefully crafting a rule that would address such concerns and at 
the same time provide for the use of specific instances of conduct in cases, like the case at issue 
here, where such instances bear directly on a witness’s veracity.  As Justice Albin explained when 
writing for the court in State v. Guenther, when “the ‘auxiliary policies’ underlying the rule do not 
apply, the rationale for the exclusion of such evidence no longer exists.”279  As shown by FRE 
608(b) and the majority of states that have adopted similar rules, it is possible to adopt a rule that 
will address the auxiliary polices and under such a rule, the rationale for total exclusion of specific 
instances of conduct would no longer exist. 
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